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  Armies of Sand

  Armies of Sand

  The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness

  KENNETH M. POLLACK

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  © Kenneth M. Pollack 2019

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  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Names: Pollack, Kenneth M. (Kenneth Michael), 1966– author.

  Title: Armies of sand : the past, present, and future of Arab military effectiveness / Kenneth M. Pollack.

  Description: New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references.

  Identifiers: LCCN 2018012932 | ISBN 9780190906962 (hard cover) | ISBN 9780190906986 (epub)

  Subjects: LCSH: Arab countries—Armed Forces—History. | Military art and science—Arab countries—History. | Military art and science—Soviet Union—History. | Arab countries—Military policy. | Economic development—Arab countries.

  Classification: LCC UA854.P654 2019 | DDC 355.00917/492709045—dc23

  LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018012932

  For my remarkable professors,

  Paul Bracken, Paul Kennedy, and the late Brad Westerfield

  In gratitude for their wisdom and guidance

  CONTENTS

  Foreword

  Acknowledgments

  Introduction: The Six-Day War and the Mystery of Arab Military Ineffectiveness

  1 Patterns of Arab Military Performance

  PART I Soviet Doctrine

  2 The Soviet Way of War

  3 Arab Militaries and Soviet Doctrine

  4 North Korea, Cuba, and Soviet Doctrine

  PART II Politicization

  5 Politicization

  6 Arab Militaries and Politicization: Egypt

  7 Arab Militaries and Politicization: Iraq

  8 Politicization and the South Vietnamese Armed Forces

  9 Politicization and the Argentine Armed Forces

  Part III Underdevelopment

  10 Economic Development and Military Effectiveness

  11 Economic Development and Syrian Military Effectiveness

  12 Economic Development and the Libya-Chad Wars

  13 Economic Development and Chinese Military Effectiveness

  14 Economic Development and Arab Military Effectiveness

  Part IV Culture

  15 War and Culture

  16 Arab Culture as an Explanation for Military Ineffectiveness

  17 Arab Culture: Patterns and Predilections

  18 Arab Culture and Arab Military Effectiveness

  19 Arab Culture and Civilian Organizations

  20 Culture and Education: The Causal Link

  21 Arab Military Training Methods

  22 Exceptional Arab Militaries: State Armed Forces

  23 Exceptional Arab Militaries: Nonstate Armies

  Conclusion: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness

  Notes

  Selected Bibliography

  Index

  FOREWORD

  WHAT’S WRONG WITH the Arab armies? Why do they lose so many wars that by all rights they should win? And why is it that when they do win, their victories tend to be so modest, if not outright pyrrhic? Why have the Arabs lost to Israel time and again? Why did it take Iraq eight long years to defeat an Iran wracked by revolution and cut off from the rest of the world? Why was that same Iraqi army then crushed effortlessly by the US-led Coalition in the Persian Gulf War of 1991? How on earth did the Libyans manage to lose to Chad in 1987? Chad! And the Libyans weren’t just beaten, they were routed. Why did the Iraqi army collapse under ISIS attack in 2014? And why was it so hard for Iraq to drive ISIS out of their country despite massive American air power and the assistance of 62 other countries?

  Those are the questions at the heart of this book.

  It’s a critical issue for the Middle East and for the United States. The puzzling weakness of the Arab armed forces has driven the military balance in the Middle East since the Second World War. Every other aspect of the international relations of the region rests on this balance. The smart Arab leaders learned over time that military solutions just weren’t a viable option for them in their dealings with other countries. Conventional force was effectively removed from their foreign policy toolkits.

  In some ways, that has been good for the United States. It has meant that the existence of Israel—our principal ally in the Middle East since the early 1970s—has been assured. The Arabs just don’t have a realistic military option against the Jewish state. It also allowed us to win a spectacular and virtually bloodless victory over Saddam Husayn in the Persian Gulf War and to prevent many other regional wars with only a small military presence.

  But it has been problematic in other ways. Saddam is only one example of an Arab leader who did not understand the weakness of his armies and so embarked on wars that he had no business fighting. That may be fine when it is one of our enemies. The problem is when it is one of our allies, like the Saudis, who in 2015 plunged into the Yemeni Civil War in a way they never should have because they lacked the capacity to win it quickly or decisively.

  Since the late 1970s, the United States has been trying to build up various Arab armies because the stronger they are, the more likely they can deter threats against themselves, and the less likely it is that the United States would have to fight on their behalf. So we have been trying to strengthen the Egyptian, Jordanian, Moroccan, Saudi, Emirati, Qatari, Bahraini, Kuwaiti, Omani, and Iraqi armed forces. Yet, as the Saudi debacle in Yemen in 2015 and the collapse of the Iraqi security forces under ISIS attack in 2014 have demonstrated, their weaknesses have typically defied our efforts to strengthen them. And when they fail, we find ourselves forced to intervene to shore them up or fight their wars for them.

  Of course, there are some Arab militaries that have demonstrated a better ability to fight. The problem is that today these are the biggest troublemakers in the region. Hizballah, ISIS, al-Qa’ida, Jabhat Fatah ash-Sham (the former Nusra Front), and a variety of other vicious, Islamist militias—both Shi’a and Sunni—have proven more able in battle than most of the armed forces of the Arab states. That too is a big problem for the United States since all of these groups see the United States as one of their primary enemies and all of them are actively fighting American allies. Understanding why these nonstate militaries have proven more effective than the state armies we have been trying so hard to improve is more than just an intriguing mystery, it is a vital national interest.

  My hope is that this book will help answer all of these questions. More than that, I hope that it will provide some sense of the changes going on in the Middle East, because they are profound and they could transform the long-standing balance of power over the next seve
ral decades.

  Finally, I hope that this book will shed more light on the broader question of how different societies generate military power and why some countries are so much more powerful than others, often in ways that seem to defy simple tallies of population and resources. The history of the world has been shaped by military outcomes that defied predictions based on simple material assumptions about what constituted military strength. The reality is that wars are far more often decided by the abilities of the combatants and that, in turn, is typically an outgrowth of the societies themselves. So to really understand the sources of military power, we often need to understand the societal factors that drive them. Doing so for the Arabs during the modern era is the goal of this book.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  IN MANY WAYS I have been writing this book for nearly 30 years. When I was a young military analyst at CIA, right after I had written the first draft of the post-mortem on the Iraqi armed forces during the Persian Gulf War, I had to clear on a report written by one of my colleagues on the Syrian military. In reading through it, I was struck by how the Syrians had all of the same problems with military effectiveness that had hobbled the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars. I began to wonder why that was. Because of their similarly dictatorial systems? Because they were both Arab countries? Because they had some degree of Soviet tutoring (although the Iraqis had far less than the Syrians)? Ever since, throughout my career, I kept pursuing the answer to that question. On all of my many trips to the Middle East and especially when talking to American, British, Australian, French, German, and other military personnel who were training or fighting alongside Arab armed forces, I kept gathering data, even as I shared my preliminary findings and insights with them in return for the stories of their experiences. This book is the culmination of that long journey.

  A work of such time and effort could only have come about with the help of many people. I want to begin by thanking my friends Daniel Byman, Brent Sterling, and Steven Ward. They get pride of place not only for providing me with a king’s ransom of thoughtful commentary, counsel, and insight, but for doing so on multiple drafts over many years. Even a book of this length could barely encompass all of their terrific suggestions and sage warnings. Of equal importance, all of them provided much-needed encouragement at moments when the weight of this effort bore me down. Like all lives, mine has had its ups and downs, but their friendship has been a constant joy throughout.

  I also need to single out Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera for their roles. The idea for this book may have come at CIA, but it did not take material form until my graduate work at MIT. The first draft of this book was my doctoral thesis, and any value that it may have had was largely due to the labors of Barry and Steve, who were, respectively, the chairman and first member of my thesis committee. Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera are two of the finest minds and finest men I know. Their teaching was invaluable. Their standards of scholarship daunting. And their criticisms devastating. It is hard for me to convey how important their guidance was in the shaping of this book, except to say that if you learn anything from it, it is because of the two of them.

  Next comes the hardest paragraph of all to write. This is the paragraph where I need to thank everyone else who read part or all of one of my drafts and provided me feedback, comments, and criticism. It is hard because each of these people gave so generously of their scant time and vast experience that they each deserve many words of praise and gratitude for their contributions. However, there are so many of them that to do justice to each would require a second volume. I hope that you—and they—understand how important their help was to me in the completion of this book. So let me just say that during the many iterations of this project I had the great good fortune to be able to call on some of the best minds in many fields to help me: Andrew Bacevich, Ali Banuazizi, Amatzia Baram, Joe Bernard, Stephen Biddle, Joe Cutler, Tom Donnelly, Michael Eisenstadt, Eugene Gholz, Shadi Hamid, John Lynn, Hank Malcom, Ian Merritt, Ben Miller, Stephanie Neuman, Bruce Pease, Ed Pendleton, Charles Perkins, Daryl Press, Bruce Riedel, Bilal Saab, John Spacapan, Lt. General Bernard Trainor, and the late Myron Wiener. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press, who likewise provided a wealth of smart comments that greatly improved this work.

  I was also fortunate to have had the help of an amazing cabal of research assistants and interns, many of whom have gone on to remarkable careers of their own—doubtless a function of their assistance with this project. Kevin Ball, Edward Bottomley, Ayatalla El Khatib, Eytan Fisch, Jonathan Lincoln, Isabelle Mahnke, Ian Merritt, Dafna Hochman Rand, Lauren Rossman, John Spacapan, and Jennifer Williams were all sensational. They deserve only praise for their roles in the crafting of this book. I know exactly why each of them is a star.

  I spent 15 of the years I was working on this book at the Brookings Institution. I want to thank Strobe Talbott, Jim Steinberg, Carlos Pascual, Bruce Jones, and Martin Indyk, my bosses during that time. I also want to thank Laura Mooney and Sarah Chilton of the Brookings library. Librarians are too often taken for granted, especially in an age where so much is now available at the press of a button. But Laura and Sarah are both great research librarians, keepers of great knowledge, an art that may soon be lost. They still practice that art with skill, and they were immensely helpful to me and my platoon of researchers.

  In 2017, I moved to the American Enterprise Institute. A journey of about 100 feet, but much farther intellectually. It was an ideal move, and I want to thank Arthur Brooks, David Gerson, and Danielle Pletka for welcoming me and running such a superb organization. As every author knows, the hardest part of any book is the endgame. I could not have asked for a better place or better people to work with than AEI to get this book across the finish line.

  The writing of this book was supported by a generous grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It was also supported by the friendship, encouragement, and wisdom of Allan Song, Marin Strmecki, and Nadia Schadlow. They have my deepest gratitude for all of it.

  Over the years, I may have conducted as many as a thousand interviews for this book, formal and informal. Only a handful of those interviewed agreed to allow me to quote them on the record. Those who did have been quoted by name in the text or the notes. Unfortunately, however, the vast majority agreed to do so only on condition of anonymity because they were serving US, Israeli, European, Australian, German, Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini, and Turkish military officers or intelligence analysts whose governments would not have approved of their making statements on the record. In other cases they were retired Iraqi, Egyptian, or Jordanian military officers who nevertheless felt it impolitic to have themselves quoted. All those who consented to be interviewed have my deepest thanks. They made this book a far richer work than it otherwise might have been.

  David McBride at Oxford has been an absolute pleasure to work with as my editor on this book. He has a light, deft touch that left the book very much in my voice, but pointed out any number of critical course corrections. He has also guided the book adroitly through the labyrinth of academic publishing. I am thrilled with Caroline McDonnell’s cover design and she also has my thanks. I think you will agree with me that the maps in this book were a key ingredient, and George Chakvetadze has my thanks and admiration for their accuracy, clarity, and elegance. Brooke Smith was a careful, meticulous copy-editor who saved this book from death by a thousand typos. Liz Davey, the production manager; Erin Meehan, the marketer; and Sarah Russo, the head of publicity for OUP, were all great and made the entire process painless and easy—which as other authors know, is about the highest praise I can offer for the laborious process of publishing and selling a book. Finally, Claire Sibley and Emily Mackenzie were just outstanding at making all of the trains run on time and helping me to get done everything that Oxford needed from me.

  A considerable amount of the historical material in this book, particularly in the Introduction and Chapters 3, 6, 7, 11,
12, and 22 are adapted from Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 by Kenneth M. Pollack by permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 2002 by the University of Nebraska Press.

  An early manuscript version of this work was reviewed by both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency prior to publication to ensure that it contained no classified material. Neither agency altered the text in any way. Nothing in its contents should be seen as asserting or implying US government authentication of my factual points or endorsement of my opinions. Moreover, I would like to thank Ben Bonk, Bruce Pease, Jack Duggan, Winston Wiley, and Phil Ferguson for helping to guide it through the laborious prepublication review process with the minimum of pain.

  Finally, I cannot end without thanking the people who matter to me most. My wife, Andrea, my son, Aidan, and my parents, Ann and Peter. They stuck with me through all of this, even if Aidan came a bit late to the party. They have my most profound thanks for putting up with the long hours researching and writing, the countless trips to the Middle East, and the overflowing shelves of books on a hundred wars and a dozen academic disciplines. More than that, they have my unfailing love.

  Armies of Sand

  INTRODUCTION

  The Six-Day War and the Mystery of Arab Military Ineffectiveness

  IN JUNE OF 1967, most of the world thought Israel was a goner. That included most of the population of the State of Israel itself. Another Arab-Israeli war was brewing, and this time it looked like the Jewish state was finished. The Arab governments, their military commands, and their people were ecstatic, anticipating the destruction of Israel.1 Many Israelis feared another Holocaust. The government braced itself to suffer terrible casualties and ordered 10,000 coffins prepared for the dead.2 Israel’s prime minister, Levi Eshkol, told a reporter that in the event of war, he feared that Israeli “Blood would run like water.”3